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Abstract
Village equilibrium models are computable general equilibrium (CGE)
implementations of agricultural household models in a village equilibrium
framework which have the salient feature of being able to capture gen-
eral equilibrium effects arising at the level of rural communities. Due to
the important role migration plays for livelihoods in developing countries,
the approach has been successfully applied to analyze aspects related to
migration and village economies. However, the depiction of migration in
village equilibrium models is not carried out in a way that captures inter-
actions between migration and household consumption demand while at
the same time allows for an endogenous adjustment of the level of migra-
tion by the households themselves. Furthermore, approaches to modeling
migration are purely demand side oriented. Supply side factors, such as
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differences between households, which may influence household responses
to changes in incentives to migrate, cannot be accommodated in a the-
oretically convincing manner. To address these issues, a nonseparable
household model with endogenous migration decisions and feedback to
the consumption sphere is proposed as the theoretical foundation for a
village equilibrium model. A composite utility function captures utility
which accrues to the household through per capita household consump-
tion of goods and leisure, on the one hand, and utility stemming directly
from participation in different activities by the household including mi-
gration, on the other hand. It is shown that the allocation of labor among
different activities is governed by the size of marginal returns to labor in
terms of market returns, changes in household demand and (dis)utility of
labor market participation relative to the household shadow wage. The
practical implementation of the theoretical framework is achieved by the
derivation of two independent demand systems from the composite utility
function. A per capita linear expenditure system is proposed to depict
household consumption demand. The allocation of labor to migration is
assumed to follow a factor demand specification using power functions
which translate utility considerations made by the household into imper-
fectly elastic responses to changes in incentives for participation in the
labor market.
Keywords: Migration, village equilibrium modeling, general equilibrium model-
ing, computable general equilibrium, village CGE, agricultural household model
1 Introduction
Village equilibrium models are computable general equilibrium (CGE) imple-
mentations of agricultural household models in a village equilibrium framework
which are used to describe and depict village economies in developing countries.
As an overlap of CGE modeling and microsimulation, village equilibrium mod-
els have the salient feature of being able to take into account heterogeneity of
economic actors up to a substantial degree as well as to capture general equi-
librium effects arising at the rural community level. The provision for heteroge-
nous agents reduces the aggregation bias inherent to macroeconomic modeling
approaches. At the same time, the consideration of interactions among agents,
which take place at a local level, catches important characteristics of economic
systems which are neglected in microeconomic agricultural household models.
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Thus, village equilibrium models constitute useful tools to analyze policy out-
comes for small groups with varying characteristics within a population, while
these models accurately capture the transmission of a particular economic shock
throughout a local economy.
In the past, village equilibrium models were used for addressing different aspects
related to labor migration. More recently, the topic of national and international
migration has assumed a prominent position in the international development
debate (see, for example, UNDP, 2009). Both the early appearance of migra-
tion issues in village equilibrium studies and the recent emergence of the topic
in the political arena are because migration and remittances in many occasions
not only make up substantial shares of household income,1 but also constitute
important means of coping with adverse shocks which threaten the viability of
a household’s economy. Because of the latter, for an economic assessment of
the role and relevance of migration, it is not only the contribution of migration
and remittances to total household income, but also the migration response of a
household following changes in the economic environment which matters. The
migration response, in turn, is determined by a range of socio-economic charac-
teristics of the household which could be summarized as supply side character-
istics. In this context, this paper proposes an alternative approach to modeling
migration in village equilibrium models. The goal is to achieve an accurate
depiction of the migration behavior of rural households which allows the model
to take into account a household’s supply side characteristics in a theoretically
consistent manner.
Representing a work in progress, this paper begins with a short review of the
literature on village equilibrium modeling with a special emphasis on the depic-
tion of migration. In Section 3 an agricultural household model is developed.
A composite utility function allowing for a supply side oriented modeling of
migration is the central piece of this model. The household model constitutes
the theoretical core of a stylized village equilibrium model, which is presented
in Section 4. The paper concludes with a section which elaborates on a possi-
ble implementation of the model, arguing that the proposed approach can be
applied to a wider range of issues involving, for example, labor allocation in
regionalized general equilibrium models.
1And, of course, remittances constitute substantial shares the GDP of entire national
economies.
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2 Literature review
Village equilibrium modeling
Village equilibrium models are built upon micro-level social accounting matrices
(SAM) which, by providing a consistent snapshot of a village economy at a
certain point in time, have soon become the preferred framework for carrying
out further analyses. Departing from village SAMs, early village level modeling
studies applied SAM multiplier approaches, including multiplier decomposition
(Pyatt and Round, 1979) and structural path analysis (Defourny and Thorbecke,
1984), with the aim of exploring the nature and strength of economic linkages
within as well as assessing the impact of economic shocks on local economies.
Issues which have been studied include, for example, the effect of changes in
inflows of remittances and government transfers (Adelman, Taylor, and Vogel,
1988), impacts of output fluctuations and investment in irrigation (Subramanian
and Sadoulet, 1990) or the assessment of alternative rural development schemes
(Parikh and Thorbecke, 1996).2
Recognizing the rather restrictive assumptions of the SAM multiplier approach,
Taylor and Adelman (1996) developed a first village CGE model by embedding a
neoclassical agricultural household model (Singh, Squire, and Strauss, 1986) into
a local general equilibrium framework. Compared to SAM multiplier models,
the village equilibrium model has the advantage of abandoning the fixed price
assumption as well as the advantage of allowing for a much more flexible depic-
tion of the behavior of economic agents. Moreover, the Taylor-Adelman model
incorporates the assumption of nonseparable household decisions, an important
feature of agricultural household models which helps to explain behavioral pat-
terns which otherwise might appear irrational from an economic perspective
(de Janvry, Fafchamps, and Sadoulet, 1991; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2003).
The main insight from nonseparable household models is that decisions of a
household subject to nonseparability are not governed by market prices, which
are exogenous to the household alone, but are instead governed by endoge-
nous shadow prices determined inside the household. Nonseparability implies
that household behavior can no longer be analyzed in a separable and recursive
2Although not strictly at the village but rather at a regional level, a study by Lewis and
Thorbecke (1992) which analyzes aggregate and household level impacts of sectoral changes
in production should be mentioned in this context, as well. Furthermore, more recent studies
which apply multiplier approaches to village level data exist (Yun˜ez Naude, Dyer, and Taylor,
2006; Subramanian and Qaim, 2009).
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manner by first optimizing income from household production and then utility
from consumption (Singh, Squire, and Strauss, 1986). It is rather necessary to
consider maximization of profit and utility as interdependent optimization pro-
cesses. As this interdependence affects the comparative statics of a household
model (Singh, Squire, and Strauss, 1986; Lopez, 1986), its implementation in
a village equilibrium model constituted a major step towards a more realistic
depiction of household behavior.
Following Singh, Squire, and Strauss (1986), Taylor and Adelman (1996) as-
sume missing markets for family labor and land as the reason underlying the
nonseparable nature of household decisions in their model; however, household
decisions may become nonseparable due to a larger variety of conditions. Non-
separability may occur when farm households act in an imperfect market envi-
ronment (de Janvry, Fafchamps, and Sadoulet, 1991; de Janvry and Sadoulet,
2003; Singh, Squire, and Strauss, 1986). Reasons why markets might be imper-
fect or even fail include variable transaction costs on product or factor markets,
fixed transaction costs which constitute market entry barriers or constraints on
market participation, and missing markets such as for capital, land or labor (see,
for example, de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2003). Apart from market imperfections,
nonseparability may be caused by imperfect substitutability between hired labor
and family labor or by preferences of households regarding the participation in
certain employment activities (Lopez, 1986; Singh, Squire, and Strauss, 1986;
Skoufias, 1994)3. Nevertheless, these reasons for nonseparability have not been
considered yet in village equilibrium models.
Kuiper (2005), however, recognizes the rather strong character of the assump-
tion on the reason which underlie the nonseparability of household behavior
in the Taylor-Adelman model. Offering an extension of the village equilibrium
approach, she introduces fixed transaction costs in product and factor markets
into her village equilibrium study of a rural community in China. This imple-
mentation of the price band model proposed by Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995)
relaxes the strong assumption of missing factor markets and allows for the con-
3There are a number of studies available which carry out analyses based on a nonseparable
agricultural household model under different assumptions regarding the reasons which lead
to nonseparability. Benjamin (1992), Sadoulet, de Janvry, and Benjamin (1998), Sonoda and
Maruyama (1999) and Sonoda (2008), for example, assume imperfect labor markets. Carter
and Yao (2002) carry out an analysis of nonseparability due to imperfections in the market for
land. Benjamin (1992) adds the case of nonseparability caused by imperfect substitutability
of hired and family labor and Lopez (1984, 1986) presents a nonseparable model in which
households have preferences regarding different occupations.
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sideration of imperfect markets as an intermediate case between a perfect and
a missing market. To date, the Kuiper model represents the latest development
in village equilibrium modeling.4
Migration in village equilibrium models
The modeling of migration in village equilibrium models exploits the possibility
to flexibly incorporate assumptions on household behavior. This offers scope for
a realistic depiction of the migration behavior of households and their migration
responses due to economic shocks. Moreover, village equilibrium models are able
to capture potential impacts of economic shocks which can be, for example, an
assumed variation in migration or flows of remittances or any change in economic
policies which in turn may provoke alterations in migration and remittances
on all members of a local community, including those who are not directly
involved in migration. Accordingly, the approach has been successfully applied
to the study of different aspects of migration. Taylor, Yun˜ez Naude, and Dyer
(1999) and Taylor, Yun˜ez Naude, and Hampton (1999), for instance, analyze
the impacts of alternative agricultural and trade policy scenarios on production,
income and migration in rural Mexico.5 Kuiper (2005) simulates the effects of
an increase in migration on production and consumption in a Chinese village.
In a similar fashion, Kuiper and van Tongeren (2006) administer a migration
shock which is part of a broader Doha Round trade liberalization scenario to
the same Chinese village model. All studies highlight the importance not only
of migration, but also of economic interactions within a village and local general
equilibrium effects for the nature of a particular policy outcome.
With respect to the modeling of migration, the village equilibrium studies cited
above use two different approaches. Taylor, Yun˜ez Naude, and Dyer (1999)
and Taylor, Yun˜ez Naude, and Hampton (1999) apply the model developed by
Taylor and Adelman (1996). In this model, the level of migration is determined
endogenously, as households allocate labor to migration until the marginal re-
turns to migration (i.e. remittances) equal the marginal returns from labor
in each alternative income generating activity. The marginal returns, in turn,
correspond to the household shadow wage. The household shadow wage itself
4Applications of this model include Heerink, Kuiper, and Shi (2006), Heerink et al. (2007)
and Kuiper and van Tongeren (2006).
5Further studies, which apply the approach economy-wide are Materer and Taylor (2003)
and Taylor and Dyer (2009).
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reflects the marginal valuation of family time and leisure. That is, the extent
to which a household engages in migration is determined to be an equilibrium
between the allocation of family time to migration and other activities and
the consumption of leisure. While this approach offers the great advantage of
allowing for endogenous changes in the level of migration as a response to a
given economic shock, it captures only two ways of how migration impacts the
household economy; namely the income from migration which accrues to the
household and the competition between migration, other activities and leisure
for the scarce time the household is endowed with (Taylor and Adelman, 1996,
p.185). It neglects, however, the impact of migration on consumption demand
due to migration related changes in the household size which can constitute an
additional benefit to the household.6 Furthermore, the approach does not take
into account potential disutility generated through the engagement in migration.
This, as the authors themselves acknowledge, may lead to an overestimation of
the level of migration (Taylor and Adelman, 1996, p.185). Kuiper (2005) tackles
the issue of the consumption impacts of migration by implementing a per capita
demand system, thus creating a feedback between the level of migration and the
consumption sphere of the household.7 Still, a change in migration is modeled
as an exogenous shock and not as a decision endogenous to the household.
Following this discussion, two major challenges with respect to modeling migra-
tion in village equilibrium models can be identified. The first challenge consists
of modeling migration as a decision endogenous to the household while simulta-
neously taking into account the impact of migration on consumption demand.
The second challenge, related to the question of disutilities arising from partici-
pation in migration, involves a more general issue with respect to the depiction
of the migration responses of households. In principle, both Taylor and Adel-
man (1996) and Kuiper (2005) model migration as demand driven in the sense
that an external demand shock triggers a supply response by households. Such
an external demand shock can either consist of changes of the wage rate in
migration, i.e. in the returns to migration as in case of Taylor and Adelman
(1996), or of a change in employment in migration as in the studies by Kuiper.
In reality, however, it can be observed that households respond differently to
changes in incentives to migration and these differences are often due to supply
6It constitutes a benefit in case of increasing household migration as there will be less
persons with demand for consumption. In case of decreasing migration, total demand inside
the household will increase. Hence, the competition for income intensifies.
7In fact, the author applies a per capita linear expenditure system (LES).
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side characteristics of the households. The presence of children or elderly, for
example, may make migration a less attractive option for a young couple. Like-
wise, the need for childcare may require at least one person to stay at home (i.e.
on the farm) and make farm work the preferred option for this person. It can be
argued that in both of the current village equilibrium modeling approaches it is
possible to accommodate migration responses which differ among households.
In the Kuiper model one could simply define household group specific migration
shocks according to assumed differences in migration responses. In the Taylor-
Adelman model differences in migration responses can be implemented through
the household specific calibration of an elasticity of remittances with respect to
family time allocated to migration which forms part of a remittances function.8
Nonetheless, both approaches would be rather ad hoc and would lack a sound
theoretical base with respect to the supply side considerations mentioned above.
The village equilibrium model developed in this paper addresses each of the
challenges identified. The village model is built around an agricultural house-
hold model which features a composite utility function consisting of a per capita
Stone-Geary utility function for consumption and a sum of power functions for
(dis)utility generated through the participation in different income generating
activities. The first part of the composite utility function ensures that feed-
backs to the consumption sphere are taken into account. The second part of
the function provides for the incorporation of supply side related differences in
migration responses between households which arise due to differences in socio-
economic characteristics. The following section presents the theoretical model
of household behavior in a general form and derives the comparative statics of
the model. After the specification of functional forms, a proposal for the im-
plementation of the theoretical model in a stylized village equilibrium model is
provided in Section 4.
3 A theoretical model of household behavior
The theoretical model presented in this section is set up in the spirit of the agri-
cultural household model developed and first presented by Singh, Squire, and
Strauss (1986). Apart from a missing market for family labor, the agricultural
household is assumed to operate in an environment of perfect markets in the
8Taylor and Adelman (1996) do exactly this but state differential access to migrant labor
markets rather than supply side factors as the underlying rationale.
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neoclassical sense. In other words, it is assumed that there are no transaction
costs, no barriers to market entry and the household disposes of perfect informa-
tion. The household consumes an agricultural good Xa, a manufactured good
Xp and leisure Xl. The agricultural good is produced by the household and
sold, while the manufactured good has to be purchased from the market. The
productive activities the household can engage in comprise agriculture, which
produces the agricultural good, local off-farm employment and migration. The
household maximizes utility with respect to the goods consumed, the labor time
allocated to agriculture Tf , to local off-farm employment To and to migration
Tm, as well as a variable capital input V and land A which are both used in
agricultural production.
The core piece of the treatment of time allocation, including migration of the
household in the model, is a composite utility function. The first component of
this function is a consumption utility function UC which captures utility gener-
ated through the consumption of the three consumption goods. The consump-
tion utility function allows for feedbacks from migration to the consumption
sphere through its formulation on a per capita basis. This component basically
draws on work by Wouterse (2006) who analyzes migration of rural households
in Burkina Faso. Choices of labor market participation are included into the
preference structure of the household through a second component of the com-
posite utility function, denoted UL. UL takes into account utility which stems
from the time allocated to farming, off-farm employment and migration. This
follows an approach pioneered by Lopez (1984, 1986) and further applied by
Sonoda (2008).
Formally, the composite utility function and the associated utility maximization
problem of the household can be defined as
max U
Xa,Xp,Xl,Tf ,To,Tm,V,A
= UC(Xa, Xp, Xl) + U
L(Tf , To, Tm) (3.1)
As mentioned above, the quantities included in UC are on a per capita basis.9
Utility is maximized subject to a production constraint which is represented
through an agricultural production function
Qa = f(Tf , V, A) (3.2)
9Actually, UC is defined per adult equivalent and is referred to throughout the paper
when using the term ”per capita”.
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where Qa is the quantity of agricultural output produced and Tf , V and A are
the inputs used in agricultural production. A time constraint ensures that the
total time use of the household for production and consumption equals its time
endowment T :
T = Tf + To + Tm +Xl
(
N −M)
= Tf + To + Tm +Xl
(
N − Tm
E
) (3.3)
Please note that in the time constraint Xl, which is defined on a per capita basis,
is scaled to total leisure consumption of the household by multiplication with a
term (N −M). This term describes the number of household members in the
economically active age who actually live in the household and express demand
for consumption, equaling the difference between the total number of persons
in the economically active age in the household and the number of migrants
M . M , the relevant number of migrants, in turn, is calculated as TmE with E
being the time period covered by the analysis and Tm being the time worked
in migration, both expressed in the same unit of measurement.10 In addition
to the time constraint, a land constraint states that the area of land A used by
the household must equal the household’s endowment with land A plus rentals
R from a land rental market:
A = A+R (3.4)
Depending on whether the demand for land from the agricultural production
activity exceeds or falls below the land endowment, R becomes positive or neg-
ative.
Next, a function of remittances accounts for the fact that migrants do not
transfer the entire income they earn to their families, but rather a fraction of it.
The remittances function incorporates the assumption that remittances are a
function of the time dedicated to migration and the wage rate wm which prevails
at the destination.11
REM = r(Tm;wm) (3.5)
10For example, if the time period under consideration is one year, the absence of a migrant
during half a year would be equivalent to 0.5 less economically active persons (which otherwise
would demand leisure and consumption goods) in the household.
11This is different from the remittances function used by Taylor and Adelman (1996) who
do not explicitly include the wage rate at the destination.
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Finally, a cash income constraint includes the requirement that total expendi-
tures of the household must equal total income IT .
paQa + woTo +REM + aR
=
(
N − Tm
E
+ ∆D
)(
paXa + ppXp
)
+ vV ≡ IT
(3.6)
Similar to the time constraint, consumption of Xa and Xp is scaled to to-
tal amounts consumed by the household through multiplication with a term
(N − TmE + ∆D), in which D is the number of dependents living in the house-
hold and ∆ is a parameter which scales D to adult equivalent consumption
levels. pa and pp represent the prices of the agricultural good and the con-
sumption good, respectively, wo is the prevailing wage rate in local off-farm
employment, a the land rental rate and v the price of the variable input.
The production function (3.2), the land constraint (3.4), the remittances func-
tion (3.5) and the cash income constraint (3.6) are collapsed into a single com-
bined constraint
paf
(
Tf , V, A
)
+ woTo + r
(
Tm;wm
)
+ a
(
A−A)
=
(
N − Tm
E
+ ∆D
)(
paXa + ppXp
)
+ vV
(3.7)
The maximization of the composite utility function (3.1) subject to the time con-
straint (3.3) and the combined constraint (3.7) leads to the conditions governing
consumption demand, time allocation and factor demand of the household.
The part of the model of highest interest from the perspective of this paper, of
course, is the way in which the household divides its time between leisure and
income generating activities, including migration. The first order conditions
which result from partial differentiation of the Lagrangian expression associated
with the household problem (see Annex A) can be manipulated to obtain the
condition which governs household migration.
1
λ
∂UL
∂Tm
+
∂r(·)
∂Tm
+
(
paXa + ppXp +
ψ
λ
Xl
)
=
ψ
λ
(3.8)
Equation (3.8) shows that to maximize utility, the household allocates labor to
migration up to the point where the returns from migration equal the household
shadow wage ψλ (i.e. the marginal utility of time ψ translated into value terms
is divided by the marginal utility of income λ). The returns from migration,
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in turn, consist not only of remittances, but also of gains in value terms from
lower demand for consumption and leisure plus a change in utility due to the
engagement in the migration activity.12
By extending the analysis to include the allocation of labor by the household to
all productive activities as well as leisure, one obtains a complete picture of the
household’s labor allocation:
ψ
λ
=
1
λ
∂UC
∂Xl(N − TmE )
=
1
λ
∂UL
∂Tf
+ pa
∂f(·)
∂Tf
=
1
λ
∂UL
∂To
+ wo
=
1
λ
∂UL
∂Tm
+
∂r(·)
∂Tm
+
(
paXa + ppXp +
ψ
λ
Xl
)
(3.9)
According to Equation (3.9), at the household’s optimum all activities and the
consumption of leisure yield the same marginal returns to the household. These
marginal returns include the monetary returns as well as a utility component
and are equal to the household shadow wage ψλ . An implication of this result is
that household decisions become nonseparable. Indeed, there is interdependence
between the allocation of labor to productive activities and the consumption of
leisure, mediated by the shadow wage which differs from any of the market wage
rates and is endogenous to the household. In contrast to previous approaches to
village modeling, nonseparability is not caused by market imperfections or miss-
ing markets. Instead, it is caused by the preferences of the household regarding
the participation in different activities. While resembling the result by Lopez
(1984, 1986), this constitutes a novelty in the village equilibrium literature.
A further implication of Equation (3.9) worth pointing out is that the model
allows the household to be engaged in various income generating activities si-
multaneously and wage rates are allowed to differ. Up to the present, it has
been necessary to assume profits on off-farm activities combined with restric-
tions on the amount of labor a household can allocate to a particular activity
to avoid complete specialization in a situation of differing wage rates (compare
12Originally, the third term on the right hand side of the equation is 1
E
(paXa+ppXp+
ψ
λ
Xl);
however, the possibly unusually looking term 1
E
becomes 1 when the time period under
consideration is assumed to be 1 (year or any other time period). This simplifies this as well
as following expressions a bit.
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Kuiper, 2005). As illustrated below, with the model presented here it is possi-
ble to abandon this assumption and dispense with quantitative restrictions on
particular activities.
It should also be noted that under the rather unrestrictive assumptions regarding
the utility function UL it remains a priori undetermined how the household’s
shadow wage relates to the market’s wage rates. In case utility is an increasing
function of the time spent in an activity (i.e. the household experiences pleasure
from being engaged in an activity which goes beyond the mere wage income),
the shadow wage may be higher than the respective market wage. In case
utility decreases with increasing time worked, the household shadow wage is
lower than the market wage.13 The actual decision for which assumption is
more valid, meanwhile, is an empirical matter.
Corresponding to the requirement formulated above, the model gives rise to
the option to model migration responses which differ among households. Un-
like other current approaches to village modeling, the explicit inclusion of the
utility connotation of migration provides a theoretical concept which includes
the supply side considerations of the household, thus departing from a pure
demand driven modeling of migration. Depending on considerations related to
their socio-economic characteristics, households may exhibit stronger or weaker
responses to changes in incentives to migrate, e.g. to changes in relative wage
rates.
The conditions governing the demand for agricultural and manufactured con-
sumption goods by the household largely correspond to standard demand con-
ditions as obtained from microeconomic demand theory. The difference is that
the conditions reflect the formulation of the consumption utility function UC
on a per-capita basis.
∂UC
∂Xa(N − TmE + ∆D)
= λpa ;
∂UC
∂Xp(N − TmE + ∆D)
= λpp (3.10)
According to Equation (3.10), the household consumes a product up to the
point where the marginal utility of consumption of the good is equal to the
marginal utility of the income spent on the marginal unit consumed. Unlike a
standard demand function, the amount of the good is scaled to the household
13This is the assumption made by Lopez (1984, 1986) and Sonoda (2008). Furthermore,
this assumption will be adopted in the village equilibrium model presented in the following
section.
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level through multiplication with a term which takes into account the change
in household size due to migration. Household demand for leisure has already
been included in Equation (3.9).
The results for demand for land and variable inputs for agricultural production
is straightforward. Demand by the agricultural activity for land obeys
pa
∂f(·)
∂A
= a (3.11)
and the demand for the variable input follows
pa
∂f(·)
∂V
= v. (3.12)
Both equations imply that land and the variable input are demanded up to
the point where their marginal value products equal the price of the respective
factor. This, again, is a standard result from microeconomic production theory.
The results for factor demand constitute the last component of the nonseparable
agricultural household model which forms the core piece of the village equilib-
rium model to be developed in the following section. With the aim of illustrating
a potential method for how the developed theory can be applied and how its
theoretical features can be exploited, the next section proceeds with translat-
ing the theoretical features into an applied model and, as a result, presents a
stylized village equilibrium model.
4 A stylized village equilibrium model
To translate the theoretical household model into a village CGE format which
can be used to carry out simulation analyses, it is necessary to specify functional
forms for the utility functions, remittances function and agricultural production
function. Furthermore, assumptions have to be made regarding the tradability
of commodities and factors. Finally, a village equilibrium framework which
accommodates these assumptions needs to be constructed. The activities of
the households which constitute the village community take place within this
framework.
As became clear in Section 3, the allocation of labor to migration, other pro-
ductive activities and leisure is largely determined by utility considerations of
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the households: The households derive utility from the consumption of leisure
and their level of utility is affected by participation in different productive ac-
tivities. Accordingly, the composite utility function proposed consists of a part
reflecting consumption utility as well as a part generating utility from labor
market participation. Due to the necessity of capturing the effects of changes
in household consumption demand which arise following changes in migration,
the consumption utility function UC is specified as a per capita expenditure
system. As a compromise between keeping matters simple and achieving a real-
istic depiction of household behavior, a per adult equivalent Stone-Geary utility
function is chosen to represent consumption demand (see Kuiper, 2005, for a for-
mer application of this approach). The labor market participation component
UL of the composite utility function in this illustrative application is assumed
to exhibit negative marginal utility of labor allocated to the different activities.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the absolute value of the marginal utility in-
creases with the amount of labor allocated to a particular activity. This implies
that households experience a certain degree of disutility from participation in
any income generating activity which increases with the amount of labor. A
simple sum of power functions is proposed here. To avoid undue complexity of
the model, remittances and agricultural production are dealt with using rather
simple functional forms. Remittances are assumed to be a linear function of
the product of time allocated to migration and the wage rate. A Cobb-Douglas
production technology is used to model agricultural production.
Assumptions regarding the tradability of products and factors determine the
mechanisms defining prices and lead to the general equilibrium framework of
the model. The six products and factors contained in the simple model devel-
oped in this paper are tradable at different levels. The agricultural good Xa,
the manufactured good Xp and the variable input for agricultural production
are assumed to be traded outside the village. Following Taylor and Adelman
(1996) these goods, which can be exported and imported at a price given by
the outside world, are denoted village tradables. Land is assumed to be traded
inside the village. This gives rise to a village rental market in which the rental
rate for land is determined by supply and demand within the village. Goods
or factors traded among households within the village and not with the outside
world are referred to as household tradables. Family labor, finally, takes a spe-
cial position. While labor is also traded outside the village, different wage rates
including the household shadow wages apply. The wage rate in off-farm activ-
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ities is fixed outside the village. The household shadow wages, however, which
ultimately governs the time allocation of the households is determined within
the households. Furthermore, the assumption that labor cannot be purchased
by households plays a role in defining the households’ balance of family labor
(see below).
Before beginning the depiction of the village equilibrium model, some aspects
regarding notation should be mentioned. First, an index h is added to house-
hold specific variables to represent the different households which constitute
the village community. Each h can be considered as an element of the set
H = {1, . . . , n}. Furthermore, two additional sets, G = {a, p, l}, which contains
all consumption goods, and B = {f, o,m}, which incorporates the different pro-
ductive activities, are defined.
Following the considerations made above, the composite utility function is
Uh = U
C
h + U
L
h =
=
∏
g∈G
(
Xgh − σgh
)γgh +∑
b∈B
(−εbhT δbhbh ) ∀h ∈ H. (4.1)
The first term on the right hand side (the second line) is the consumption utility
function UC in which all Xg are defined per adult equivalent. σgh describes
the fixed committed (or subsistence) consumption quantities and γgh are the
marginal expenditure shares. The second term constitutes the utility function
for labor market participation UL. The parameters εbh and δbh determine how
time allocated to a particular activity translates into utility. The negative sign
which precedes Tbh ensures that the households experience a disutility from
labor market participation.
Constrained maximization of the utility function (4.1) with respect to consump-
tion goods and leisure leads to a per capita linear expenditure system (LES)
(Sadoulet and de Janvry 1995, p.42; Kuiper 2005, p.137ff.). Demand for the
agricultural and manufactured good is described by
Xah =
paσah + γah
(
Ih −
∑
g∈G pghσgh
)
pa
∀ h ∈ H (4.2)
and
Xph =
ppσph + γph
(
Ih −
∑
g∈G pghσgh
)
pp
∀ h ∈ H. (4.3)
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where plh, the price for leisure is
ψ
λ h
(see below) which – unlike prices of the
other consumption goods – differs among households.14 Demand for leisure is
Xlh =
ψ
λ h
σlh + γlh
(
Ih −
∑
g∈G pghσgh
)
ψ
λ h
∀ h ∈ H (4.4)
In equations (4.2) to (4.4), quantities and income are defined per adult equiva-
lent. For remaining parts of the model total quantities per household are used.
Thus, it is necessary to establish a relationship which scales per adult equivalents
to total quantities:
XTgh = Xgh
(
Nh − Tmh
E
+ ∆Dh
)
∀ g ∈ G, h ∈ H. (4.5)
Likewise, per adult equivalent income is scaled to total household income by
ITh = Ih
(
Nh − Tmh
E
+ ∆Dh
)
∀ h ∈ H. (4.6)
Equations (4.2) to (4.5) together constitute the expenditure block of the village
equilibrium model which comprises commodity and leisure demand. As a result
of the expenditure system being defined in a per adult equivalent basis, the time
dedicated to migration (i.e. the time spent by a migrant outside the household)
exerts a direct influence on consumption demand in Equation (4.6). This estab-
lishes the feedback between migration and household consumption. Household
income, in turn, has not been defined yet. It consists of the returns to the
factors owned by the households and employed in the three different activities.
Hence, before defining total household income, the production functions for each
activity will be stated along with the associated factor demand functions, i.e.
the allocation of factors to respective activities. As migration is in the focus of
this paper, we begin with the treatment of this activity.
As already indicated above, any kind of off-farm employment is treated as a
production activity. The output of this activity is a commodity sold to the
labor market. Consequently, the simple production function directly maps the
amount of labor supplied into an output of the activity.15 In case of migration,
14Consequently, the prices pa and pp should be denoted with an index h, as well. For
notational convenience, however, the index on the two prices is suppressed.
15This may appear superfluous in the current context, but will prove useful when building
a village equilibrium model upon a village SAM.
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the production function is
Qmh = Tmh ∀ h ∈ H (4.7)
where Qmh is the amount of labor sold to a migrant labor market. In addition,
the treatment of the allocation of labor to migration requires the specification
of a remittances function. While more complicated functional forms are con-
ceivable, a simple linear function is chosen:
REMh = κh
(
Qmhwm
) ∀ h ∈ H. (4.8)
Apart from the time allocated to migration and the wage rate which prevails
at the destination, the equation contains a parameter κh which takes a value
between 0 and 1, determining the share of a migrant’s income which is accrued
to the households in the form of remittances. Following Equation (3.9), factor
demand for the migration activity or, equivalently, the allocation of household
labor to migration has to fulfil the condition
κhwm =
ψ
λ h
+
1
λh
εTmhδTmhT
δTmh−1
mh −
(
paXah+ppXph+
ψ
λ h
Xlh
)
∀ h ∈ H
(4.9)
which states, as above, that in the optimum the households equate marginal re-
turns from migration with marginal costs. The marginal costs, in turn, consist
of three components. The first component is the household specific shadow
wage ψλ h, i.e. the opportunity cost of the factor. The second component
1
λh
εTmhδTmhT
δTmh−1
mh , which will be discussed in detail below, reflects the disu-
tility arising from migration to the specific household. This generates a markup
to the shadow wage and, equivalently, diminishes the value of the returns from
migration. The third component (paXah + ppXph +
ψ
λ h
Xlh) emerges due to the
definition of a per capita LES. As this third component takes a positive value,
it works contrary to the disutility component and increases the marginal re-
turns from migration. This latter component represents the second part of the
feedback between migration and the consumption sphere.
The mechanics of Equation (4.9) are best illustrated through the effect a sup-
posed increase in wm. First of all, a rising wm requires that the right hand side
of the equation increases, too. This raises the household shadow wage and the
time allocated to migration. However, both movements are counteracted by an
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increase in the term (paXah + ppXph +
ψ
λ h
Xlh). This increase happens due to
the higher shadow wage, a higher income and, as a consequence of the latter
and a smaller household size, an increase in per capita consumption quantities
(compare Equation (4.5)). Ultimately, a new equilibrium (which also involves
second round effects through changes in income and quantities consumed) with
a higher level of migration is established.
At this juncture the overall behavior of the equation and, in particular, the
amount of labor shifted to migration as a response to the wage shock, hinges
on the calibration of the parameters λh, εTmh and δTmh. First of all, the initial
values of all terms other than the disutility component are determined a priori
through the data used in the SAM which underlies each village equilibrium
model. Furthermore, the initial amount of time Tmh dedicated to migration
is also given. This implies that λh, εTmh and δTmh have to be calibrated in
a way that the value of the disutility component allows the equation to be
true. In other words, the value of the disutility component must equal the
difference between the marginal returns from migration and the shadow wage
minus the value of per capita household consumption. In addition, the values of
λh, εTmh and δTmh determine how fast the disutility component changes from
a change in migration, i.e. how much labor has to be shifted to migration to
achieve a given change in marginal disutility. The less labor is necessary for
a given change in disutility, the faster the equilibrium is established and the
weaker is the migration response of the household. Consequently, Equation
(4.9) represents a utility function based implementation of different migration
responses of agricultural households, allowing to account for supply side factors
in a theoretically consistent manner. It should, however, be emphasized again
that the content of this paper represents a work in progress and at the time
of paper submission, the functioning of the calibration (and consequently the
entire model) in a computer based implementation was not attempted.
The second activity households are engaged in is local off-farm employment.
As in the case of migration, the ”output” of the local off-farm activity is the
amount of labor supplied to the local off-farm labor market. Accordingly, the
production function
Qoh = Toh ∀ h ∈ H (4.10)
maps the time worked in local-off farm jobs into an output variable Qoh. Accord-
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ing to Equation (3.9), the factor demand equation for local off-farm labor must
ensure that the wage earned equals the household shadow wage minus a utility
component which reflects the disutility generated through the participation in
the activity:
wo =
ψ
λ h
+
1
λh
εTohδTohT
δToh−1
oh ∀ h ∈ H (4.11)
Once again, the disutility component drives a wedge between the shadow wage
and the market wage rate. The points made above about the calibration of
the parameters λh, εTmh and δTmh apply. Just as in case of migration, it is
possible to incorporate assumptions rooted in the utility concept which exert
an influence on the strength of the households’ responses from changes in the
market wage rate.
The final income generating activity of the households is agricultural production.
As mentioned above, the agricultural good is produced with a Cobb-Douglas
production technology
Qah = αhT
βTfh
fh V
βV h
h A
βAh
h ∀ h ∈ H. (4.12)
In this equation, the α is an efficiency parameter while the parameters β repre-
sent the cost shares of the respective inputs. The functions for factor demand
from agriculture are
Vh =
βV hQapa
v
∀ h ∈ H (4.13)
for the variable input and
Ah =
βAhQapa
a
∀ h ∈ H (4.14)
for land. While these equations correspond to standard factor demand functions
for a Cobb-Douglas production technology, the inclusion of farm labor into the
utility function leads to a modified version of the demand for this factor in the
agricultural activity:
Tfh =
βTfhQapa
1
λh
εTfhδTfhT
(δTfh−1)
fh +
ψ
λ h
∀ h ∈ H. (4.15)
Equation 4.15 states that the marginal value product of family labor (MV Pl) in
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agriculture has to be equal to the cost of the factor, which consists of two com-
ponents. These components, again, are the shadow wage, i.e. the opportunity
cost of labor, and a utility component. Just as in migration and the off-farm
activity it allows the MV Pl and the shadow wage to differ by a margin which
corresponds to the disutility generated through the participation in the activity.
The points made above regarding the calibration of the parameters λh, εbh and
δTbh remain valid.
Equations (4.7) and (4.9) through (4.15) build the production block of the model
which includes the allocation of family labor to migration and other activities.
Now it is possible to define the remaining part of the model, including total
household income as the sum of the returns from the factors owned by the
households
ITh =
(ψ
λ h
+
1
λh
εTfhδTfhT
δTfh−1
fh
)
Tfh + woToh + κwmTmh
+
ψ
λ h
XTlh + aAh ∀ h ∈ H.
(4.16)
The first term on the right hand side of Equation (4.16) consists of the re-
turns from household labor employed in agriculture. For an applied model, two
possibilities exist to deal with this term. First, one may evaluate ψλ h with an
estimated value (Jacoby, 1993) and assume that possible residual profits which
remain after deducting all payments to farm inputs and factors (which include
household labor evaluated at the shadow wage) from gross revenues represent
the disutility component. Alternatively, the assumption can be made that the
disutility from working on the farm experienced by the households equals zero.
In this case, factor remuneration and, implicitly, the household shadow wage
equal gross revenues minus the payments to purchased inputs and land. The
second and third term on the right hand side represent household income from
local off-farm employment and remittances. Please note that similar to the re-
turns from farm labor, both terms can be decomposed into payments to labor
evaluated at the household shadow wage and a disutility component. The first
term in the second line of the equation counts the value of leisure as income. This
is necessary because leisure is included into the model as a consumption good
(see equation (4.4)), which implicitly means that households purchase amounts
of leisure they consume themselves. Finally, households receive income from
land according to their endowment. This income is taken into account by the
last term in the equation.
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The expenditure and production blocks defined in the preceding paragraphs by
Equations (4.2) - (4.5), (4.7) and (4.9) through (4.15) along with the income
equations (4.6) and (4.16) describe the behavior of the households in the model.
To complete the model, it is necessary to define additional household and vil-
lage level constraints. The equilibrium conditions incorporate the tradability
assumptions made above and determine the price formation mechanisms for the
different goods and factors. Thus, they define the market environment within
which the households operate.
The first set of equilibrium conditions involves the household level constraints.
In case of the produced agricultural good, households have the possibility to
either consume or sell it to the market. Due to the lack of other uses, total
consumption and sales, denoted as Sah, must be equal:
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Qah =
(
Nh − Tmh
E
+ ∆Dh
)
Xah + Sah ∀ h ∈ H (4.17)
The manufactured good and the variable input, which households are not en-
dowed with and which cannot be produced by themselves, have to be entirely
purchased from the market. Accordingly,(
Nh − Tmh
E
+ ∆Dh
)
Xph = Pph ∀ h ∈ H (4.18)
and
Vh = PV h ∀ h ∈ H (4.19)
form the respective household level commodity balances.
In case of land, rentals by households from and to the village market are possible.
This implies that the sum of the use of land by the agricultural activity and net
rentals Rh must equal the land endowment of each household:
Ah = Ah +Rh ∀ h ∈ H (4.20)
From Equation (4.20) net land rentals are defined as the residual from household
land endowments and land use by the specific household.
The last commodity balance at the household level is a time constraint. As
16This involves the assumption that households are always net-sellers of the agricultural
good which can be maintained for marginal changes in exogenous variables.
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labor time cannot be purchased, total time use by the households for productive
activities and leisure must equal the time endowment:
Th = Tfh + Toh + Tmh +Xlh
(
Nh − Tmh
E
)
∀ h ∈ H (4.21)
In addition, and although not strictly a commodity balance but a balance of
payments, households cannot spend more income than they earn:
ITh =
(
Nh − Tmh
E
+ ∆Dh
)(
paXah + ppXph +
ψ
λ h
Xlh
)
(4.22)
Note that unlike the budget constraint of the theoretical model, leisure is now
explicitly included. Furthermore, (net) expenses on variable inputs and land
rentals are not included because the income equation (4.16) states net household
income.17
Following the household commodity balances and balance of payments, village
level balances constitute the second set of system constraints in the model and
define the village equilibrium framework. For household labor, which is not
traded between households and which cannot be purchased, it is sufficient to
formulate balances at the household level. Hence, no additional equation has
to be added. In case of the agricultural good, total supply in the village must
equal total demand
∑
h∈H
Qah =
∑
h∈H
(
Nh − Tmh
E
+ ∆Dh
)
Xah +
∑
h∈H
Sah (4.23)
For the manufactured good and the variable input, total demand must equal
total imports18
∑
h∈H
Pph =
∑
h∈H
(
Nh − Tmh
E
+ ∆Dh
)
Xph (4.24)
and ∑
h∈H
PV h =
∑
h∈H
Vh. (4.25)
17That is, instead of gross revenues only factor returns are included.
18It should be noted that Equations (4.23) - (4.25) are already fulfilled by household level
balances and thus could be excluded from of an applied model. Nevertheless, they are included
here to provide a complete representation of the village equilibrium framework.
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For land, a village market exists. Consequently, total demand for land in the
village must equal total supply, which is the village’s land endowment:∑
h∈H
Ah =
∑
h∈H
Ah (4.26)
Similar to the household level, a village balance of payments has to be defined,
stating that total payments on imports must correspond to the inflow of pay-
ments to the village:
pp
∑
h∈H
(
Nh − Tmh
E
+ ∆Dh
)
Xph + vVh
= pa
∑
h∈H
Sah + wo
∑
h∈H
Toh +
∑
h∈H
(
κhwmQmh
)
(4.27)
The final set of equations of the village equilibrium model concerns the relevant
decision making prices. In this version of the model, it is sufficient to assign an
exogenously fixed value to prices for which the village is a price taker, i.e. the
prices of village tradables and off-farm labor including migration
pa = pa (4.28)
pp = pp (4.29)
v = v (4.30)
wo = wo (4.31)
wm = wm (4.32)
(4.33)
where a bar marks exogenously fixed values.
The rental price for land a is determined by the interplay between supply and
demand within the village and the household shadow price ψλ h is formed inside
each household. Hence, the only equation which has to be added here is
plh =
ψ
λ h
(4.34)
which defines the price of leisure used in the sum notations of the demand
equations (4.2) - (4.4) and completes the model.
24
5 Conclusions and outlook
The stylized village equilibrium model elaborated in Section 4 proposes a util-
ity function based approach towards modeling migration, taking into account
feedbacks between migration and the consumption sphere of a household. This
approach offers the possibility to incorporate household preferences with respect
to migration into the model and to allow for differing responses from changes in
incentives to migrate. Offering a supply side perspective rooted in a theoretical
agricultural household model goes beyond the demand side oriented modeling
encountered in current village equilibrium approaches.
In the depiction of labor allocation, including migration, the adequate calibra-
tion of the factor demand functions, which ultimately govern the labor market
participation of the household, plays a crucial role. Evidently, as the param-
eters have no direct real-world equivalent which would allow for an empirical
estimation, the calibration involves a search procedure to find parameter values
which yield labor supply responses of households which might be considered
realistic by the modeler. Most ideally, however, the modeling exercise would be
accompanied by econometric work to analyze household labor supply responses
to changes in relative wage rates (see, for example, Skoufias, 1994; Sicular and
Zhao, 2004). The parameters in the factor demand functions would be cali-
brated to match the findings of this empirical work. This approach offers the
perspective of obtaining results which have a better empirical foundation.
An important feature of the model worth emphasizing, is that households are
able to be engaged in several income generating activities simultaneously. This
happens without the necessity of reverting to analytical constructs, such as
the introduction of profits into off-farm activities or the imposition of quanti-
tative restrictions on off-farm employment. Instead, an equilibrium situation
is achieved in which households allocate certain amounts of labor to different
activities. This equilibrium depends on the preferences of households, on the
one hand, and on the market environment – demand for labor reflected in a
particular wage rate – on the other hand. The focus in this study was to model
migration while allowing for migration responses which are able to differ be-
tween households. The approach presented above, however, could be applied
to a larger variety of problems. More generally, it is possible to model diver-
sification of income sources while avoiding complete specialization – something
which is often found in reality. More specifically, a more sophisticated applica-
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tion of the approach could be used to model regional labor market equilibria
in national or global CGE models. Through the inclusion of households’ geo-
graphical preferences for employment, a criterion for employment choices, such
as limited spatial mobility, which the household considers in addition to the
wage rate offered on the market could be introduced. Nevertheless, for a mo-
ment the village equilibrium model presented here offers a sound alternative to
current village equilibrium models as it is able to capture household preferences
better.
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A Lagrangian of the household problem and first
order conditions
The Lagrangian expression associated with the household problem laid out in
Section 3 is:
L = UC(Xa, Xp, Xl) + UL(Tf , To, Tm) +
+ λ[paf(Tf , V, A) + woTo + r(Tm;wm) + a(A−A)−
− (N − Tm
E
+ ∆D)(paXa + ppXp)− vV ] +
+ ψ[T − Tf − To − Tm −Xl(N − Tm
E
)]. (A.1)
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Partial differentiation of the Lagrangian leads to the following first order con-
ditions:
∂L
∂Xa
=
∂UC
∂Xa
− λpa(N − Tm
E
+ ∆D) = 0 (A.2)
∂L
∂Xp
=
∂UC
∂Xp
− λpp(N − Tm
E
+ ∆D) = 0 (A.3)
∂L
∂Xl
=
∂UC
∂Xl
− ψ(N − Tm
E
) = 0 (A.4)
∂L
∂Tf
=
∂UL
∂Tf
+ λpa
∂f(·)
∂Tf
− ψ = 0 (A.5)
∂L
∂To
=
∂UL
∂To
+ λwo − ψ = 0 (A.6)
∂L
∂Tm
=
∂UL
∂Tm
+ λ
∂r(·)
∂Tm
+
+ λ
paXa + ppXp
E
+ ψ
Xl
E
− ψ = 0 (A.7)
∂L
∂A
= λpa
∂f(·)
∂A
− λa = 0 (A.8)
∂L
∂V
= λpa
∂f(·)
∂V
− λv = 0 (A.9)
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∂L
∂λ
= paf(Tf , V, A) + woTo + r(Tm;wm) + a(A−A)−
− (N − Tm
E
+ ∆D)(paXa + ppXp)− vV = 0 (A.10)
∂L
∂ψ
= T − Tf − To − Tm −Xl(N − Tm
E
) = 0 (A.11)
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